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| SECTION H - WORK OUTS |
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The concept of the informal ‘work out’ might be said to be based
on a combination of the following elements:
- the fact that
there is a significant size of debt owed to a number of different
creditors (mostly these would be bank or other financial institution
creditors) and the present inability of the corporate debtor
to service that debt;
- the attitude that it may be preferable to negotiate
an arrangement for the financial difficulties of the debtor
both between the debtor itself and the financiers (and perhaps
other lesser creditors) and also between the financiers themselves;
- the availability of relatively sophisticated
refinancing, security and other commercial techniques that
might be employed to alter, re-arrange or re-structure the
debts of the corporate debtor or the corporate debtor itself;
- the sanction that if the negotiation process
cannot be started or breaks down there can be relatively swift
and effective resort to the application of an insolvency law;
and
- the prospect that there may be a greater benefit
for all through the negotiation process than by direct and
immediate resort to the insolvency law.
In relation to these elements:
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(a) identify which of these elements are appropriate and relevant
to this economy;
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The feedback from lenders in Malaysia indicates that there is
no real uniformity in what motivates lenders to move towards an
informal work out as opposed to resorting to insolvency proceedings
or enforcing security rights. Be that as it may, subject to that
caveat, the following elements may be said to be appropriate and
relevant to Malaysia:
- The fact that there is a significant size of debt owed to
a number of different bank and other financial institution creditors
and the debtor is unable to service that debt.
- The attitude that it may be preferable to negotiate an arrangement
both between the debtor and the financiers and between the financiers
themselves; however, it has been said that this only applies
if the corporate borrower has had a good relationship with its
financiers and is perceived to be responsible.
- The sanction that if the negotiation process cannot be started
or breaks down there can be relatively swift and effective resort
to the application of an insolvency law.
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(b) which of these elements might be considered absent, ineffectual
or of little consequence in this economy?
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From the feedback from the lenders, the following elements seem
to be either absent or of little consequence:
- The availability of relatively sophisticated refinancing,
security and other commercial techniques that might be employed
to alter, re-arrange or re-structure debts of the corporate
borrower or the corporate borrower itself.
- The prospect that there may be a greater benefit for all
through the negotiation process than by direct and immediate
resort to insolvency law.
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(c) which of these elements would be viewed as the least persuasive
if a work out was contemplated?
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The prospect that there may be a greater benefit for all
through the negotiation process than by direct and immediate resort
to insolvency law may be said to be the least persuasive if a work
out was contemplated. On the other hand, the Corporate Debt Restructuring
Committee ("CDRC") initiative announced on 28.10.98 [as to which
see Section Q of this Paper] emphasizes the common greater benefit
notion
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(d) are there any other elements that are relevant to this
issue in this economy?
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From the feedback, one element that is mentioned by the lenders
that determines their approach is their initial perception of
the viability of a work out. Their attitude would be different
if it was readily apparent at the outset that the corporate debtor's
situation was so bad that a work out would not be viable.
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