|
| SECTION KK - FRAUD |
|
| This section deals with fraud by owners/directors of corporate
debtors. It may be 'hard' fraud (for example, transfer of assets of
the corporate debtor, illegal transfer of money) or "soft' fraud (for
example, false accounting). |
|
(a) Are there instances of fraud in relation to a corporate
debtor in this economy?
|
Yes, there are some reported instances of fraud in relation
to a corporate debtor. One commentator observed that the majority
of fraud is soft fraud involving cooking the numbers' so a company
can get by.
|
|
(b) If so, is it usual that instances of such fraud will be
revealed when a corporate debtor is in financial difficulty or
becomes insolvent?
|
It would be most common for instances of such fraud to
come to light during an investigation of a debtor during a workout
or in the process of a formal liquidation.
|
|
(c) What is the attitude that is normally taken to such fraud
in this economy?
|
The problems involving fraud in an environment of family
controlled business are complicated by the fact that the fraudster
(perhaps a director or a controlling shareholder) may well be both
part of the problem and part of the solution. In a workout scenario,
creditors may well have to choose between moral or financial satisfaction:
the aggressive pursuit of criminal sanctions against the fraudster
may well lead to the collapse of a potential corporate rescue. Similarly,
in a liquidation there are incentives for a liquidator to focus
more on collecting assets than on investigating and reporting criminal
activity. See Consultation Paper on the Winding Up Provisions
of the Companies Ordinance, supra, para 17.50 at 139-40. Thus,
pragmatic creditors and liquidators might well rely on civil, rather
than criminal, sanctions and seek recovery from the relevant parties.
|
|
(d) Is it the case, for example, that 'soft' fraud may be
overlooked (or not pursued) and 'hard' fraud may more likely be
pursued in this economy?
|
Both types of fraud will be pursued although more frequently
through civil, rather than criminal, channels.
|
|
If there have been instances of fraud:
|
(i) does the insolvency law (or other civil law) provide
for possible recovery of the proceeds of (or damage caused by)
the fraud;
|
Recovery can be sought to enable the repayment to be made to
creditors and criminal cases may be referred to the Secretary
for Justice or the Commercial Crime Bureau ('CCB'). At present,
civil recoveries in instances involving fraud probably occur
in only 1-2 case per year. Few directors are prosecuted for
fraud.
Section 60 of the CPO (discussed in Section K2 above) enables
a liquidator (and creditors) to attack fraudulent conveyances.
|
|
(ii) does the criminal law provide for possible sanctions;
|
Yes, prosecutions can result. As noted in Section M below,
Section 277(1) of the Companies Ordinance provides that if,
in the course of a winding up by the court, it appears that
any director has committed a criminal offence then the liquidator
may be directed to refer the matter to the Secretary for Justice.
A similar obligation is imposed in Section 277(2)) upon a liquidator
in a voluntary liquidation. In practice, reports will also be
made to the CCB. Interestingly, there is no statutory requirement
for a liquidator to make a report of criminal behaviour to the
police. Consultation Paper on the Winding Up Provisions of
the Companies Ordinance, supra, para 17.42 at 138.
|
|
(iii) how effective is the application of these laws in
practice?
|
The existing system is reasonably effective. However, the Sub-Committee
on Insolvency, in its Consultation Paper on the Winding Up
Provisions of the Companies Ordinance has recently noted
the 'need for a general reconsideration of how dishonesty on
the part of company directors might be addressed more effectively'
(para 17.48 at p 139) and suggests that 'the reporting of crime
should attract a higher priority than appears to be the case
at present.' Id, para 17.49 at p 13.
The enactment of a corporate avoidance power regarding transactions
at an undervalue would also enable a liquidator to respond more
effectively in many instances.
|
|
(e) Would it be common or usual that instances of fraud would:
|
(i) be largely ignored;
|
|
(ii) settled by negotiation; or
|
|
(iii) pursued through either civil or criminal law sanctions?
|
Thus, the overall result in most cases would be that the fraudulent
actions would not be ignored. Negotiation would be the preferred
option, but if an agreement could not be reached with the fraudster,
recovery would be pursued through civil remedies. Criminal prosecution
would be rare.
|
|
|