SECTION 12 - TENTATIVE PROPOSALS FOR MODEL OF BEST PRACTICES

From Section 2

All corporations, both private or state-owned (with the exception of banking corporations), should be subject to the same insolvency law regime.

From Section 2

An insolvency law regime should provide for the possibility of accessing both the liquidation and the rescue processes under a single procedure.

From Section 2

If a corporation seeks to implement a rescue process the insolvency law regime should provide for an early assessment of whether there is some real prospect of rescue. If the corporation fails that or any subsequent assessment it should be automatically transferred to the liquidation process.

From Section 2

Access to the process provided for under an insolvency law regime should provide for a quick, convenient and inexpensive procedure for both a corporate debtor and creditors, but with sufficient safeguards to protect against abuse of the process. Evidence should be provided of insolvency or financial difficulty of a corporate debtor.

From Section 2

, Under the liquidation process

If the debtor corporation has applied for liquidation or if it is determined that the debtor corporation is only suited to liquidation, the powers of the existing management should be removed and an independent administrator should be appointed to assume those powers and the conduct of the liquidation. Secondly, the stay or suspension of actions and proceedings against the property of the debtor corporation should be confined to unsecured creditors only. Thirdly, since there would be little or no requirement of ongoing funding for such a debtor corporation, no particular provision need be made for it.

, Under the rescue process

In the case of a genuine rescue attempt, the position should be quite different. In that case it is suggested that the existing management might continue but with overall supervisory and ultimate power in an independent administrator. Secondly, the stay or suspension of actions and proceedings against the property of the debtor corporation should apply to all creditors (secured or otherwise) for a reasonable length of time, but subject to applications by affected creditors for relief from the stay. Thirdly, the legislation should both sanction and provide a "super priority" (ahead of all creditors) for funding of necessary on-going and urgent business needs of the debtor corporation.

From Section 2

The insolvency legislation should provide for swift and strict time limits for the initial processing of an insolvent corporation. The court or other tribunal system must be properly resourced to enable the process to be implemented.

The longer term administration of an insolvent corporation which is being liquidated may be conducted through a special government agency but with provision to enable more difficult and complex cases of liquidation to be administered by an outside independent specialist insolvency administrator. The government agency must be properly resourced to enable it to perform its functions efficiently.

Cases of rescue should be administered by an independent specialist administrator.

All cases of liquidation or rescue should be subject to supervision by the appropriate court or tribunal.

From Section 2

The administration of a corporation in liquidation is a public responsibility and should be viewed as part of the overall regulation of corporations. It is possibly best handled by a specialist government agency which must be adequately resourced and financed.

From Section 2

An insolvency law regime should provide, as part of the rescue process, for an independent investigation and report of the affairs and the financial position of the corporation. It should also provide for an independent assessment of any rescue proposal in respect of the corporation.

From Section 2

An insolvency law should make proper provision for the involvement of creditors as part of the liquidation or rescue process. In particular:

, the insolvency law should clearly define the voting rights of creditors and should prescribe minimum requirements for the approval of a plan of rescue;

, provision should be made for voting by classes of creditors, particularly secured creditors, if the rescue proposal is required to bind such classes;

, the law should also provide protection against manipulation of the voting system and, in particular, should ensure that a court or other tribunal is empowered to set aside the results of voting which are obtained by the exercise of votes of insiders or persons who are related to the corporation, its shareholders or directors; and

, the effect of a vote of the requisite majority of a class should be made binding on all creditors of that class.

From Section 2

An insolvency law regime should, as far as possible, preserve the principle of equal treatment for all creditor

Accordingly, the insolvency law should limit the number of priority claims to as few as possible.

From Section 2

An insolvency law regime should contain adequate provisions relating to avoidance of transactions which result in damage to creditors or conflict with the principle of equal treatment of creditors of the same class.

From Section 2

An insolvency law regime should contain provisions for the civil sanction of fraudulent and other conduct which causes damage or loss to creditors of an insolvent corporation.

From Section 2

An insolvency law regime should include the provisions of UNCITRAL cross-border model law.

From Section 8

  • It is important that there is support for the value that contractual obligations should be honoured. This requires that individual enforcement and recovery rights may be effectively taken and efficiently processed. This is not only important for individual creditors. It is also important because it operates as a pressure point on a corporate debtor who cannot fulfill a contractual obligation because of financial difficulty or insolvency. A corporate debtor who wants to otherwise survive may then have to seek remedy or relief under the insolvency law or informal insolvency process.
  • Remedy or relief for a corporate debtor from the enforcement of individual creditor rights should support the value of a fair and orderly collective process. The existence of an effective and efficient formal insolvency process serves that purpose.
  • A formal collective process should provide for a restraint on enforcement of all individual creditor rights for a limited period of time and should only be extended if there is a certain probability of a successful rescue proposal. Otherwise the enforcement of secured and lease creditor rights should not be restrained.

From Section 9

Statistical information on corporate insolvency should be published by the responsible authority on a quarterly basis with a yearly summary. It should provide details of:

  • the number of companies which in that quarter have become subject to a formal insolvency administration;
  • breakdown of those numbers into the categories of liquidation and rescue and, within each category, details of dates of incorporation, reasons for failure and the principal business in which each corporation was engaged at or immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency administration; and
  • estimates of the assets and liabilities of such companies.

It would also assist if, upon the completion of each corporate insolvency administration, the responsible authority recorded the following information to which the public would have access, namely:

  • the name of the corporation and date of incorporation;
  • the names of the directors;
  • the nature of the administration, the date of its commencement and completion;
  • the principle business of the company prior to the administration;
  • the cause/s of the insolvency;
  • the assets (estimated and realised) and liabilities (estimated and realised); and
  • a breakdown of payments made from the administration into general categories such as the cost of administration, employee payments, tax payments and dividend to unsecured creditors.

From Section 10

1 The banking sector (ideally with the endorsement and assistance of a central bank and/or finance ministry) should promote the introduction and development of a "code of conduct" directed toward the use of an informal out-of-court work-out process for dealing with corporate financial difficulty or insolvency.

2 If necessary the work-out process might be facilitated by establishing an independent office or secretariat to perform the following roles:

  • acting as a center to enable both corporate debtors and banking and finance institutions to initiate a forum for the possible commencement of the process;
  • assisting, if necessary, the commencement and continuation of the process through negotiation and mediation;
  • providing continued education and training for corporations; bank and finance institutions; and creditors generally of the work-out process and techniques relating to refinancing, restructuring and rehabilitation;
  • referring problems and difficulties that may be encountered in proposing elements of a work-out (in particular, problems caused by the absence of suitable laws or the presence of restrictive or non-facilitative laws, rules and regulations) to government with recommendations for their improvement or reform; and
  • providing references to an established panel of independent specialist experts and advisors whose services may be required for the development of refinancing and reorganisation proposals.

3 If necessary, insolvency laws providing for rescue should be amended to enable proposals developed as a result of the informal process to be referred to a relevant court or tribunal for the purpose of seeking approval from creditors and the sanction of the court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions for such approval and sanction as contained in the relevant insolvency law.

4 An insolvency law regime should provide for the protection of "new money" in order to encourage and enhance the prospect of a successful informal work-out (and formal rescue).

5 To encourage and facilitate the development of informal work-out processes, an insolvency law regime should provide convenient and quick access to its procedures.